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Of the many sins of method with which economists are charged, few
should concern us more than the accusation that when facts are hard to
explain, we take refuge in irrefutable allegations. A widely accepted rule
for avoiding this sin calls for dealing only in "observable" magnitudes.
But following the rule has tended to exclude the intuitively attractive
possibility of interpreting events in terms of expectations, on the ground
that expectations were not observable.
For the postwar period, the discipline of confrontation with evidence
has been extended to many interpretations that rest on expectations, since
the rapid growth of expectational statistics has greatly broadened the range
of empirical testing. But the postwar data arise from surveys that tap the
informant after his expectations are framed and before the anticipated
events take place. Expectations not picked up currently can be recon-
structed only as we can find documentary traces. And while many traces
exist, most of the evidence about expectations held in the past is so
scattered and fragmentary as to defy analysis. Thus it seemed until recently
that explanations through expectations of events before World War II
must remain in the limbo of the unobservable.
However, one broad expectations survey, at least, goes back as far as
1927. In years when economists regarded anticipations as only a matter
for speculation, practical men concerned with railway traffic were already
collecting and publishing a quarterly survey of the freight-car require-
ments foreseen by traffic managers for each oncoming quarter year.' The
survey by the railroad shippers' advisory boards seems to have preserved
a high degree of comparability, with slight and infrequent changes in
commodity classification and methods of compilation, over most of its
thirty-year span—the longest span incidentally of any expectations series
1NationalForecast of the Regional Shippers' Advisory Boards Concerning Freight-Car
Requirements: Estimated Percentage Increase or Decrease as Compared with Actual
Carloadings Same Quarter Last Year, Association of American Railroads, Car Service
Division. The bulletin appears quarterly a week or two after the opening of the quarter
for which estimates are made.
Note the reference in the title to a percentage-change comparison with the corre-
sponding quarter of the previous year; this is crucial to the argument of the present
paper.
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surveyed by the students of the subject so far. And with its thirteen regions
and fairly detailed commodity breakdown, the survey offers over two
hundred separate nonagricultural series for analysis. While a far from
perfect substitute for a sample of returns from individual informants, this
richness of structure gives us some prospect of getting inside the aggregates
and tracing changes in the dispersion of anticipations.2
Previous Studies
DISCOURAGING RESULTS OF FERBER AND HULTGREN
The pessimistic findings of the pioneer studies by Hultgren and Ferber
have discouraged an intensive study of this body of evidence.3 Hultgren
was concerned primarily with the predictive value of the forecasts for
estimating actual railway traffic. He concluded that working merely from
observed seasonal patterns of the actual carloadings "a simple mechanical
procedure yields estimates of total traffic that are somewhat less erroneous
on the average than the estimates obtained by the elaborate advisory
board procedure."4 Ferber was more concerned with the relation of antici-
pations to the experience out of which they grow, and he found that "in
effect the shippers in the aggregate expect a sharp reversal of trend which
will erase more than half of the gain (or loss) from A1—5 to A1_1."5 As to
direct forecasting value, like Hultgren he found that estimates made by
extrapolation alone systematically showed smaller errors than did the
shippers' forecasts themselves, in the interwar period.6
On the face of these findings, the shippers' forecasts for the interwar
period would seem of little value. If they really embody the expectations
by which business operated, they ought to show coherent relationships
both to antecedent and to ensuing events. We dare not be too utopian
in our standards of "coherence": reported expectations cannot be both
a good image of what businessmen expected and a good forecast of actual
events unless businessmen were good prophets. The well-known fact that
2The National Bureau's array of current diffusion indexes includes a carloadings
index computed from the nineteen national totals for nonfarm commodities in the post-
war bulletins. If the clerical effort were thought worthwhile, the number of items could
be expanded to rather over two hundred (19 x 13 less a few blanks) by using regional
figures in detail; and the time span could be carried back to 1927.
3ThorHultgren, "Forecasts of Railway Traffic," Short-Term Economic Forecasting,
Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955; and
Robert Ferber, The Railroad Shippers' Forecast, University of Illinois Press, 1953.
4p. 377.
5P.91. In Ferber's convenient notation, A, is an actual magnitude of period t, Eg an
expected magnitude for the same period. E, is viewed as framed in period t— 1. (The
Appendix to this paper contains all the symbols used and their definitions.)
6P.60. Ferber did find (pp. 61 and 131-132) that the postwar data showed more
predictive value. But this is cold comfort. We have alternative sources of postwar
expectations data. It is for the interwar years that the shippers' forecast, if a valid
measure of expectations, would be uniquely valuable, because for those years we have
only fragments from other sources.
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inventory expansion runs past peaks into downswings and its contraction
past troughs into upswings shows major errors of foresight. And so does
the substantial influence of business fluctuations upon stock prices. Yet
if the shippers' forecasts were really segments of business operating plans,
how could they be so completely devoid of forecasting value (Hultgren)
or so paradoxically related to past experience (Ferber)? Did the firms lack
coherent operating plans? Or if they had such plans, did their traffic
managers fail to transmit them through their forecasts?
Motivated perhaps by a vested interest in expectations, I went behind
the results of the pioneer studies and restudied the data by methods which
reflect the structure of the advisory board surveys.7 While I have been
able to process too little of the data to obtain conclusive results, my
revaluation suggests that the forecasts did embody valid information
about coherent operating plans, and that we can bring this information
to the surface by correcting for certain standing biases. I find that the
shippers' forecasts for the interwar period:
1. Predicted well at times when it is reasonable to suppose that operating
plans could be executed.
2. Failed to predict at turning-points in just the way a true measure of
the expectations of fallible businessmen should.
3. Embodied a coherent and reasonable extrapolative relation to ante-
cedent experience, together with valid nonextrapolative elements.
My general conclusion is that we seem to have here a body of data which
may enable us to test against evidence many hypotheses that have been
regarded as nonrefutable.
BASIS FOR THE PESSIMISTIC FINDINGS
The pessimistic findings of the two pioneer studies, it should be pointed
out at once, have evidence behind them. By a simple graphical technique
(Chart 1), we can see their basis in the original data.
The continuous curve at the top of the chart shows Ferber's compilation
of actual carloadings for all manufactured products from 1927 through
1941 with my seasonal adjustment.8 Comparison with the Federal Reserve
Board index of manufacturing production (lower curve) shows extremely
close conformity of shape most of the way across the chart, with two
exceptions:
1. At the beginning of the series, the high level of carloadings shown
for I 1927 seems to have no warrant in the production series—perhaps
because the survey did not shake down at once to its permanent pattern.
7Foran account of the way the surveys are made, see Ferber, pp. 15-21.
8Iadjusted the data for seasonal fluctuations using a moving seasonal derived from
ratios to moving averages. The coefficients used, together with data before and after
seasonal adjustment, are shown in Appendix Table A-I.
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CHART I
Actual and Shippers' Forecast Carloadings, All Manufactured Products
and Manufacturing Production, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted,
1927—1941










2. At the end of the interwar period, reported actual carloadings fail to
share the vigorous rise of production in 1940-41. There may well have been
a marked relative shift, in view of the intensified level of fabrication of
manufactures and the relative growth of products which were self-trans-
porting. Yet we cannot rule out the possibility that the "actual" car-
loadings of 1940-41 lacked comparability with those of 1927-39.
Consequently I limited my analysis to data from 111927 through IV 1939.
Each forecast (for the same total of carloadings with the same seasonal
adjustment) is shown as a point—tied back by a thin line to the actual
level of the previous quarter. Each thin line can be seen as an abortive
projection of the solid curve, showing how it would have continued had
the results of the survey added up to a perfect forecast.
If our only concern were the general level of carloadings, we might
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view the stub lines merely as a bit of fuzz clinging to the continuous curve
of actual carloadings, and assert that the forecasts give a fairly good picture
of the actual level.9 Obviously there is a high correlation (r2=0.84)
between the estimated leveland the actual levelin the seasonally
adjusted series. Unfortunately for the value of the raw forecasts, however,
the correlation is considerably weaker than the one obtained on the
naïve-model hypothesis that is related to the preceding observation
Furthermore, a joint use ofand to predict
yields an imperceptible partial correlation (r2$A$E-'= 0.02)for SE1.
We are forced to conclude that the raw forecast has no net predictive
value for the level of carloadings.'°
As forecasts of quarter-to-quarter changes, the thin lines indicate an
almost perfect record of failure. It almost looks as if the shippers had
followed the cheap but infallible rule for being right at turning-points (at
the expense of being wrong all the rest of the time) by always predicting a
turning opposite to the last turn observed. During recessions, the raw
forecasts not only are too high, but they keep saying, "Beginning next
quarter we will be on the upgrade again." Conversely during upswings,
almost all the thin lines point downward. Thus the forecasts seem "regres-
sive" in the classical sense, as Ferber points out. Instead of recognizing
that a swing in progress may continue, they seem uniformly to point to
some sort of reversion toward a norm.
The Shippers', Forecasts as Four-Quarter Estimates
Before we write off the shippers' forecasts as useless, however, we must
examine them for what they purport to be. To look at them as estimates of
quarter-to-quarter change may misrepresent them. For the whole emphasis
of the survey is on comparison of the oncoming quarter with the same
quarter in the previous year. What we have before us is a body of consist-
ently biased four-quarter-change estimates.
9Thisfact presumably explains the failure of the compilers of the survey to identify
and correct the biases analyzed below. The Proceedings of the regional Shippers'
Advisory Boards show great interest in a quarterly "accuracy check" matching the
latest available actual figures (ordinarily two or three quarters back) against forecasts
for the same date. But the check concentrates on levels, while it is analysis of rates of
change that enables us to measure the biases.
10Ifwe run the same correlations on data without seasonal adjustment, we get results
somewhat more favorable to the forecasts. A simple correlation of A1 with A1-1 yields
an r2 of about 0.85; a joint regression of A1 on A1_1 and E1 yields an R2 of about 0.89.
The implied partial r2 of A1 on E1, taking account of At_i is about 0.24.
This result suggests that E1 does contain an element of valid allowance for seasonal
fluctuations, although the root of the bias in the E's is lack of confidence in shippers'
ability to allow for seasonahty! But in this type of comparison, we are penalizing our
naïve hypothesis for having a shape which embodies no seasonal allowance. If we started
from Ag-1 and an estimate of seasonally-to-be-expected change, there would probably
again be no trace of net predictive value for E,.
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The coherence of the four-quarter estimates is shown in Chart 2. Since
we are interested in four-quarter changes, I drew a separate curve for each
time of year. As in Chart 1, I linked the actual carloadings in a continuous
curve, showing forecasts as points connected with the corresponding
previous actual data by thin lines. In only 6 instances (marked on the chart
by 0) does the thin line fail to move in the same direction as the actual
data—that is, the forecast fails to give the same direction of
change as the actual Only in 5 (marked by t)doesthe estimate
give the right direction but overstate the change. In 3 instances (marked
by theestimate and outcome coincide.11 In the other 33 instances, the
forecast four-quarter change is right in direction but too small—too
small, typically, by rather more than half.
The failures to point in the right direction, furthermore, are not only
few but interestingly dated. Of the 6, 3 (at IV 1929, 111933, and IV 1937)
suggest the missing of major turns in activity.12 As the facts on inventory
accumulation indicate, such major turns involve major surprises for the
business community. Thus the discrepancies do not conflict with the
hypothesis that we are looking at reports rooted in the actual plans of
business. On the contrary, what is really disconcerting is the failure of the
forecast to miss the upturn in 1938, for which the special explanation
may be that this was an extremely well-advertised revival, in view of the
lively concern of the public with the government's antirecession policy.
In addition, the fact that the upturn first registers as an actual four-
quarter gain, in I 1939 shows that information had unusually good
opportunity to be right.
CORRECTION FACTORS
Confronted with such a systematic bias, the natural response of the
analyst who wants to forecast is to counter it by a systematic correction.'3
The logic of such a correction will be different if instead we aim to recon-
struct an image of what businessmen thought would happen. But before
11 For details, see Table A-2.
12 Two of the remaining 3 (at III 1934 and III 1935) represent the missing of sharp
interruptions of a major upswing. Note that the 3 errors of direction in the forecast that
are linked with major turning-points come afterturns(at III 1929, 11933, and 111937)
in the seasonally adjusted actual data shown in Table A-I. In each case, the quarter
of the error in direction is that in which the swing of business took on momentum after
a start which might have been felt as a mere wobble.
13 See the strictures of the Consultant Comniittee on Business Expectations on the
failure of the Illinois study to make such adjustments, in Reports of Federal Reserve
Consultant Committees on Economic Statistics, Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, 1955, pp. 533-534. As the Committee pointed out, the desirability of a correction
was recognized by Franco Modigliani, the director of the Illinois study which included
Ferber's monograph. But Modigliani's tests of such adjustments applied them to the
forecasts treated as one-quarter-change estimates (Eg/A,_i) rather than as four-quarter
estimates. See Franco Modigliani and 0. H. Sauerlender, "Economic Expectations and
Plans of Firms," Short-Term Economic Forecasting, pp. 283-286, and 308.
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facing these difficulties, we should pause to see what correction factors
the data yield.
Actual four-quarter changes are graphed as a scatter against raw
shipper-forecast changes in Chart 3. Four points on the chart are left
floating. The two marked D represent the two quarters (IV 1929 and IV
1937) when major downswings took on momentum; the two marked U
represent the quarters (II 1933 and III 1938) when major upswings took
on momentum. The slopes of the lines joining the remaining points to
the center of gravity of the scatter may be seen as estimates from individual
observations of the degree of understatement in four-quarter change
forecasts. It is plain from the scatter that the estimates are averageable.
Regression analysis using all quarters except those marked D and U
suggests that our best estimate of the actual change from a given is
given by the equation:
Estimate of Vt =h Vt =0.997 + 2.269 (e —1.026)
whereais the actual four-quarter change (that is, andeis the
change indicated by the raw forecast (that is, E1/A1_4). The constant terms
0.997 and 1.026 introduce a correction for the over-optimism in level of
the forecast change (which averages + 2.6 per cent whereas actual change
averaged —0.3 per cent); the multiplier 2.269 introduces a correction for
the understatement of change.'4
For the forty-two quarters used to fit the regression, the predictive value
of this estimating equation is impressive. It yields an r2 of about 0.89.
Contrary to our finding for the raw forecasts of level, this correlation far
exceeds that of comparable naïve-model hypotheses. The hypothesis that
0Y, can be predicted froma yields an r2 of only 0.756.
This naïve-model hypothesis cannot be perceptibly improved by bringing
in also the previous value for the resulting R2 is only
0.764. Thus the shippers' forecast shows a considerable superiority to
naïve-model hypotheses in predicting four-quarter change, by the test of its
gross predictive value.15 Combining hwithaYe—i,gives an R2 of 0.89—
no better than the simple r2 for halone. Thus the net predictive value
14 This coefficient is the reciprocal of the regression ofeOn aIpreferred this to
the alternative regression (2.024) of aonY, primarily to minimize deviations in the
direction of presumed error, because the actual data should be less subject to error than
the raw-forecast E's.
15 If we were concerned with forecasting for its own sake rather than as a test of our
ability to reconstitute a picture of expectations, the case for the shippers' forecast would
be still stronger. For the actual shipments A,—, cannot be measured with any precision till
several weeks after the forecast E, is available. A practical forecast of aY,from data
observable in advance, therefore, could use only h Y, and aYg_2A,_2/A,_6.But F2 for
aYt Ofl a Yt-2 is only 0.45. And of course since aY,_ishows no net predictive value when
combined with hYt,the same is and must be true for aY12.So for practical purposes,
the record suggests that the shippers' forecast is useful, and the available extrapolative
data useless.
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of the forecast, when we add it to extrapolative evidence, is to reduce
unexplained variance from about 0.24 to about 0.11, with a partial r2of
about 0.55. We must infer that the reconstituted forecast ratiohcontains
valid evidence over and above what a simple extrapolation would yield.'6
Turning to the formation of expectations, the greater part of the gross
forecastingvalue ofhYdoes seem to trace to its content.
We find an r2of0.83 betweene(which of course must have the same
correlation ashY1)and the previous actual changea 1'tiA1_11A,_5. This
can be raised to an R2 of 0.86 by including a as a second
independent variable.'7 Since the extrapolation can explain more of the
forecast than it can of the actual data, while the forecast has substantial
16 My precautions of lopping off the suspect 1940-41 figures and omitting the four
quarters most affected by major turns in activity turn out to have been needless for
getting unbiased estimates of the degree of understatement and of the predictive power










Number of quarters 42 50 46 54
Understatement correction:
l/bea 2.28 2.24 2.28 2.24
Simple r2's:
aYi Ofl eYl 0.90 0.82 0.87 0.81
aYt Ofl aYt-1 0.76 0.72 0.76 0.70
eYI Ofl aYt-1 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.80
aYt on aYt-2 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.43
eYl Ofl aYl-2 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.48
aY:—1 Ofl aY:—2 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.71
Multiple R2's:
aYt Ofl eYi, aYt—i, aY:-2 0.90 0.83 0.88 0.82
aYt Ofl a)'t-l, aY:-2 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.74
eYs Ofl aYi—I, aYt—z 0.86 0.85 0.81 0.81
Partial r2:
aYt Ofl eYt, with
aYt—1, aYt-2 constant 0.57 0.34 0.47 0.32
Regardless of coverage, the forecast four-quarter change shows stronger grosspre-
dictive value than the last two experienced changes (singly or in combination), and has a
strong partial r2(whilethe gain from r2ae to is so trifling as to yield
insignificant partial correlations for the extrapolative series).
17 Though a l't-2 makes only a modest net contribution to the prediction of the forecast
—2a1 —1 = 0.17),the partial regressions look sensible. We obtain:
eYt =O.59(ay,—,)O.lS(ays—2)
=O.44(ayg—i)+O.lS(ayt—1aYt—2)
Remembering that the percentage change shown byYt has to be amplified by about
2.27 to correct for understatement, this is to be interpreted as saying that the forecast
has as its basic element the change from t—5 to t— 1,tempered by the recent rise or fall
in the rate of change.
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CHART3
Four-Quarter Link Relatives of Actual and Shippers' Forecast
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netpredictive value, we must infer that extrapolation injected a certain
amount of error into the forecast—more than offset by nonextrapolative
elements in the forecast.
If we included the four D and U quarters in the analysis, the apparent
relation of actual to forecast four-quarter change would be weaker. On
this basis, the r2 for actual changes in carloadings on shippers' forecast
changes would be only 0.87 instead of 0.90, and the partial r2, taking
account of the two previous changesaY1-1 and would be only 0.47
instead of 0.57. But this is as it should be: the hypothesis that we are
looking at forecasts based on the actual plans of fallible businessmen
requires that including these quarters should weaken the relationship. On
the other hand, it is somewhat damaging to the hypothesis that including
the D and U quarters changes the relation of the forecast to antecedent ex-
perience: the R2 for the forecasteon the previous actual changes
and drops from 0.86 to 0.81.
INTERPRETATION OF UNDERSTATEMENT
While a correction for understatement along these lines is statistically
plausible, is it economically and psychologically plausible? If the correc-
tion were only a small fraction, there would be no problem. Instead it is
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over the quarter t —4 is in prospect for the quarter t. Then the seasonally
adjusted level at the time the forecast is framed (toward the end of quarter
t —1)is likely to be perhaps 15 per cent above that of quarter t —4. How
then can we explain the shippers saying that A will be only 8 per cent
above putting their estimate (say)7 per cent below the
seasonally adjusted level which exists as they frame their forecast?
A number of interpretations have been suggested, notably:
1. Mixed in with four-quarter-change forecasts from one group of
informants are one-quarter or two-quarter forecasts from another group.
2. Mixed in with four-quarter-change forecasts from one group of
informants are "no-change" forecasts from another group who do not
really mean what they say.
3. The four-quarter-change forecasts are scaled below the change
informants actually expect out of "statistical conservatism."
Probably each interpretation has some validity, but the main weight falls
upon the third.
Mixture of One-Quarter and Four-Quarter Forecasts. The first possible
interpretation may be inferred from a suggestion by Modigliani and
Sauerlender, though they would clearly never have offered it as the major
explanation of the discrepancies in the shippers' forecast.18 If for example
one-quarter changes averaged one-fourth of the four-quarter changes that
include them, and if half the informants substituted one-quarter forecasts,
this would explain an understatement of actual change by three-eighths.
A scattering of such responses is clearly possible, since survey procedures
have never been standardized. Yet there are strong indications that the
collectors of the survey and their informants do in fact aim to compare
with the same quarter a year previous. The National Forecast bulletin,
which shippers receive quarterly, refers in its title to a year ago, and from
the beginning has printed its results in four columns—actual cars loaded
a year ago (at t—4), cars to be loaded in quarter t, percentage increase
(for industry groups estimating a rise), and percentage decrease (for those
estimating a fall). Ferber's survey of the way data are procured suggests
that all the various procedures used lead the informant to look at last
year's figures and that none call upon him to look at figures for inter-
vening quarters.'9
ISQp•cii.,p.303: "Respondents are not really replying to the question as worded, but
(perhaps subconsciously) [to] a question" about change over a shorter period. Their
suggestion is addressed specifically to discrepancies in the Dun and Bradstreet survey,
where there seem to be ambiguities in the reference dates the informant is supposed to
use. They put much the same stress as does the present paper on the strong emphasis
placed by the shippers' survey on the previous-year reference point, which should reduce
the frequency of short-period forecasts in the returns of individual informants.
19Ibid.,p. 17. The lack of standardization is of course the reason Ferber fails to repro-
duce any questionnaire forms.
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Furthermore, an interesting piece of numerological evidence indicates
that shippers do aim their forecasts to refer to four-quarter changes—
the prevalence of rounded four-quarter-change percentages. Offhand,
since we are supposedly looking at the ratio of a summation of estimated
cars in quarter t to actual cars in quarter t —4 for a number of shippers,
it would seem fantastically unlikely that we should often find such per-
centages for= as 100.0 or 90.0. Yet in fact such round numbers
are decidedly common in the printed figures. Many of the items for
particular commodities in particular regions must not in fact be survey
results, but "single-voice responses." By this I mean that some single
spokesman is taking it upon himself either to substitute his judgment for
that of his commodity group or at least to round the figures yielded by the
survey. In the Alleghany district, where such responses have been relatively
common, the roughly 760 entries of estimated change e= E1/A1_4
1928-39 include 128 which are multiples of 5.0 per cent.2° If we may take
it that the single-voice responses that crop up in print have much the same
character as individual responses buried in the aggregates, it would seem
clear that it is normal to relate the forecast to the same time last year as
suggested by those who collect the figures. There does not seem to be any
greater frequency of round-figure estimates for one-quarter changes than
could arise by chance.2' While these figures relate to only one district,
and to a district where round-figure published entries may be unusually
common, it apparently is not a district where understatement is unusually
mild. If anything, preliminary analysis suggests more than average under-
statement in the Alleghany district. Thus inclusion of one-quarter-change
20 Specifically:
PerCent Number
Items of 100.0 44
Other multiples of 25.0 20
Total multiples of 25.0 64
Multiples (other than 50, 100, and 150 per cent) of 10.0 36
Total multiples of 10 or 25 100
Multiples (other than 25 and 75 per cent) of 5.0 28
Total multiples of 5.0 128
In addition, we find a few multiples of 33.3 per cent, and many of 2.5 per cent, 2.0 per
cent, and 1.0 per cent. Also several commodities often show estimates diverging in a
uniform direction from a round figure by an amount of 0.1 or 0.2 per cent—suggesting
a single voice covering of the industry, with a few informants filing separate returns.
Thus the figure of 128 understates the number of round-figure responses by an amount
that is hard to specify.
21 This impression may be unreliable. The National Forecast is not published in a
form to facilitate one-quarter comparisons; two numbers must be collated to match
with At-i. In any event, figures for At-i are incomplete by several weeks as each
respondent frames his E1, so the published totals for A1 would not be accurate sums of
the estimates informants would use if they tried to estimate one-quarter changes.
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estimates erroneously processed as four-quarter estimates does not seem
to account for much of the understatement.
Mixture of Change and No-Change Forecasts. The second explanation
would be that the published figures may be an averaging together of
relatively realistic estimates of four-quarter change by some respondents
with unrealistic estimates of no change submitted by or on behalf of other
respondents.22 An estimate of no change (that is,e 100.0
per cent) would on its face mean, "I forecast that A, will be the same as
within 1 or 2 per cent." Often, this is what it does mean. But a no-
change estimate could also be a code message meaning, "Estimation for
date t has to be on such a shaky basis that I refuse to forecast and enter
last year's figure not because I think it will really be repeated but because
my answer must be arbitrary." A postwar example of such a code message
is the filing by the mine operators' association in the Ohio Valley district
of no-change estimates in 1946 and in 1949 when there were strikes in the
quarter when the estimate was framed. No-change estimates are surprisingly
common. Some seem to be code messages of the type just described.
Others are entered as a clerical routine in regional offices when data are
not at hand for a real forecast, especially for commodities so unimportant
in the district that there is no commodity chairman.
This second hypothesis was my favorite when I prepared the original
draft of my paper. But I was able to devise a few tests, and the results
suggest that it does not account for the bulk of the understatement.
Scrutiny of the forty-four no-change entries for nonfarm commodities in
1928-39 in the Alleghany district shows that a large proportion come at
stages when it seems likely that almost-no-change may have been the
informant's real meaning; that is, they come between an estimate of
increase and an estimate of decrease. Furthermore, for a group of nine
commodities with no-change estimates in the Alleghany district in 1935-39,
I tried replacing no-change figures with the average estimated change in
the remaining series. This procedure, which should remove understate-
ment resulting from no-change code messages, had remarkably little
effect on the size of estimated changes.23 I must conclude that this factor
22 This hypothesis was drawn to my attention by Millard Hastay (see his comment at
p. 571 of the committee report on general business expectations, Reports of Federal
Reserve Consultant Committees on Economic Statistics, Joint Committee on the Eco-
nomic Report, 1955). It develops that the same suggestion was made by Geoffrey Moore
in correspondence and by Robert Ferber in a paper in the Journal of the American
Statistical Association, September, 1953, pp. 385—413.
23 For all nine industries, the average without regard to signs of the twenty forecast
four-quarter changes in 1935-39 is 7.3 per cent. Calculating change to each quarter t
only for those of the nine industries which do not estimate E,/A,—4= 100.0 per cent raises
the average to 8.1 per cent. This is for a period including two major turns, if the two
quarters (IV 1937 and III 1938) excluded from calculations in the text are excluded here,
the average forecast change becomes 6.6 per cent for all nine industries, 7.6 per cent for
those which do not estimate "no change" in the quarter in question. The selection of
industries in which single-voice responses seem to be normal should make this a reason-
able test of the quantitative importance of coded no-change estimates.
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as well as the admixture of one-quarter-change estimates is incapable of
explaining the bulk of the understatement.
Statistical Conservatism. We are left, then, with statistical conservatism,
which may take any of several different forms.24 The traffic manager may
suspect the production and sales departments of the firm of furnishing
exaggerated estimates of change. Or having framed estimates in line with
theirs, he may tone them down before he submits them to the advisory
board. (He may think that if he had the direction of change right, he will
not lose credit for sagacity by understating the size of the four-quarter
change. And if by any misfortune he turns out to be wrong about direction,
he will look wiser if he has not said the change will be large.) Or the
compilers in the office of the advisory board or commodity chairman may
tone down estimates which look extreme to them.25
If the procedure of the survey was such that the informant always had
the full benefit of the record of the year so far in deciding what figure to
submit, statistical conservatism could scarcely yield regressive forecasts
which show a change from quarter t—4 to quarter t smaller than has
already taken place from quarter t—4 to quarter t— 1. But apparently
businessmen still rarely keep their records on a seasonally adjusted basis;
even fewer did so in the interwar period. The whole same-time-last-year
basis of comparison expresses a lack of confidence in the informant's
ability to sort out seasonal from nonseasonal changes in the events of the
last few months. If the informant consults his records for any quarter
other than t —4, the likeliest figures to use for orientation will be either
the recently completed ratioa=A1_2/A1....6or the almost-completed
ratio using a forecast for the results of the
quarter which is in process when the forecast e)'t=L'r1111_4 must be
framed. If, say, the ratio a1':_i=ulg_11141_5 bids fair to be 115 per cent, it
may seem conservative to put at 110 per cent.
We must choose among the three hypotheses if we wish to assert that
the respondent at the back of the survey really has a carloading expecta-
tion in line with a coherent operating plan, an expectation somehow given
a biased report in the survey. If we deny this proposition, there are two
other possible interpretations of the data:
4. The traffic manager really expects much what is reported—for example,
he really expected each quarter in 1930-32 to see the downswing reversed
immediately—but has no coordination with the rest of his firm. (If the
firm as a whole really expected an upturn in each of these quarters, it
would have maintained employment and produced to inventory, which
we know from the history of the period most firms did not.)
5. The traffic manager was really not talking about the plans of his
24Apossibility also adumbrated by Modigliani and Sauerlender.
25MichaelLovell tells me he has found indications in one regional office of a syste-
matic leveling down of individual responses which suggest drastic change.
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firm, but merely "participating" in the activity of his regional advisory
board by playing a numbers game. In this case, his figure was designed
simply to fit into a pattern, which implies that it will be purely a figure,
for which there is no source but extrapolation of recent carloading figures.
These two hypotheses have one crucial element in common. They imply
that the traffic manager has no evidence to go on from other aspects of
his firm's operation and works only from the record of carloadings—
supplemented perhaps by evidence from outside the firm on general busi-
ness conditions, of which he can scarcely be an expert analyst.
The present analysis of the predictive value and apparent genesis of
forecasts is reasonably selective between these two families of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4 or 5 requires that extrapolative naïve-model hypotheses
should match or better the performance of the shippers' forecast, whether
raw or corrected for bias. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 require that the forecast
(raw or corrected) should perform so well that we must infer the use of
valid nonextrapolative evidence, and scrutiny of the four-quarter-change
estimates has supported this view. The next step is to correct for under-
statement of change, treat the results as if they represented realistic
operating intentions, and see whether they can outperform naïve hypo-
theses in "explaining" levels of shipments and one-quarter changes.
THE RECONSTITUTED H-PREDICTION OF LEVEL
Given our regression for four-quarter changes, it is simple to reconsti-
tute an implied series of estimated levels of carloadings. For each quarter t,
we have a raw forecast of four-quarter change e=E1/A1_4.We can
transform this into a forecast purged of change understatement and level
optimism by writing:
h1Tt= l.OO+2.27(eYil.03).
If we use the symbol H1 for the implied expectation of the level of
carloadings, we can simply write H1(h1'A1—4), or with seasonal adjust-
ment sH1 =(h 1',.sA1_4).We can then graph the s111'sagainstactual car-
loadings (Chart 4) on the same convention we used for the raw-forecast
sE1's in Chart 1. Against a solid curve of seasonally adjusted SA,'s, the
seasonally adjusted sfr11's are shown as points, each connected by a thin
line to the point representing sA1_1.26 A glance at the chart shows that our
26An alternative procedure for deriving H-predictions would be to seek an under-
statement coefficient that would minimize squared deviations for levels of carloadings or
for one-quarter changes, rather than for four-quarter changes. In correlation terms,
what we minimize in the procedure used in the text is the sum of squares
when aY and eY are deviations from the means of a Y, and e Vg. To get the minimum
squared deviation of levels or one-quarter changes, we would minimize a weighted sum
of the squares of such terms. The weights are base-period shipments (At_4's) for the
estimate of levels, and ratios (Ar_4/A:_i) for one-quarter changes. An experiment on the
latter basis yields to three significant figures the same understatement coefficient we
obtained from the unweighted sum, so that in the present case it probably matters little
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CHART4
Actual and Forecast Carloadings, All Manufactured Products,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted, 1927—1939
Millions of cars Millions of cars
simple adjustment has shaken out almost all the nonsense that appeared
in Chart 1. The levels shown by the H-predictions diverge much less from
the actual carloadings. Into the bargain, the slopes of the thin lines agree
most of the time with the slopes of corresponding segments of the actual
carloadings curve.
A regression analysis of the reconstructed H-prediction in relation to
the actual data is thoroughly compatible with the hypothesis that the
H-prediction represents genuine expectations. On a seasonally-adjusted
basis, for the forty-three quarters when it is reasonably likely that plans
which procedure we use. The logically simpler method of the text happens not to be
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could be fulfilled, there is an r2of0.949 between the actual leveland
the reconstituted forecast sHe. This is slightly superior to the r2of0.943
foron the previous actual level sA1_1 over the same forty-three quarters.
True, both these coefficients can be bettered by a slightly more refined
extrapolative hypothesis: has an R2 of 0.956 over the forty-three
quarters with and sA1_2 combined. But if we take a multiple correla-
tion which combines these two pieces of extrapolative evidence with
sH1, the R2 for forty-three quarters goes up to 0.969, implying a partial
r2of0.30 for the H-prediction. This result squares very well with the
hypothesis that the reconstituted forecast combines extrapolative evidence
with valid nonextrapolative evidence in the minds of informants.27
This impression is strengthened if we exclude also the testimony of the
eight quarters marked T on the chart—quarters so linked with major
turning points that substantial surprises are likely (though not so highly
probable as for the D and U quarters). For the remaining thirty-five
quarters, the first naïve model (correlating with yields an r2
of0.931, and the second (correlating sA with a combination of sA1_1 and
sA1_2) an R2 of 0.947. Both correlations can be bettered by the simple
correlation ofwith which yields an r2of0.960. Furthermore, the
inclusion of sJ-J,withthe two previous actual figures raises the R2 from
0.947 to 0.970, implying a partial r2of0.45 for the H-prediction.28
As to the formation of expectations, the regression analysis shows the
reconstituted forecastin a sensible relation to preceding experience.
We get essentially the same relation of the forecast to preceding experience
whether we do or do not exclude the quarters when intentions must or
may have been frustrated.29 On a forty-seven-quarter basis, we arrive at
the regression equation:
=
27Forall forty-seven quarters (including the D and U quarters where our hypothesis
requires the informants to be in error), the simple and partial correlations for the H
prediction are lower; the partial r2isonly about 0.18.
28Asbefore, if our central interest were forecasting as such, we would have to rule out
on the ground that it was not available as soon as The latest previous actual
figure which could definitely be used (SAt_2) has a much lower correlation withthan
does the unavailable If we use all forty-seven quarters (to take the basis least
the H-prediction), a simple correlation ofwith yields an r2ofonly
0.83, as against r2of0.91 for Slit and an R2 of 0.93 for both variables combined. Thus
for practical forecasting, availability of SHt would have been a great improvement. On
the other hand, we used some hindsight in estimating because both the seasonal
adjustment and the understatement coefficient rest on data for the entire period; a
current estimate ofwould presumably have been inferior.
29Regressionresults are as follows:
Numberof
Quarters Joint Regression Equation Alternative Form B2
35 5hg = 0.938
43 =0.983as_j+0.62(Sas_i_sa,_2) 0.937
47 S/jg= = 0.932
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This implies that our putative "real expectation" (for which H, is a
synthetic substitute) is built up by starting with the last quarter's actual
carloadings (on a seasonally adjusted basis), and adding about two-thirds
as large an increment as occurred between quarter t —2 and quarter I —1.
There is then presumably a further addition or subtraction for non-
extrapolative indications, as indicated by the fact that the reconstructed
forecast outperforms the extrapolative naïve models in the quarters when
it appears that the outcome was likely to be close to the expectation.
The Shippers' Forecasts as One- Quarter Estimates
THERECONSTITUTEDH-PREDICTION OF CHANGE
It is demanding a great deal of the reconstituted H-prediction to ask it
to predict one-quarter changes. Our basic supposition is that the shippers
had reasonably well integrated operating plans, but that the signals they
sent in through the shippers' forecast about their plans were garbled in
transmission. The adjustment in derivinghfrome= may be
looked at as a device for filtering out noise picked up in transmission and
thus approximating the original signal. But it is scarcely likely that the
optimism about level and the size-of-change understatement which con-
stitute the noise were so uniform through time as we imply by using a
single constant to correct for each.3°
Inspection of Chart 4, however, shows that in fact the H-prediction
gives a rather sensible picture of quarter-to-quarter changes. Notably, the
long series of regressive one-quarter-change forecasts shown by the raw
figures of Chart 1 for 1930-32 and 1935-37 is replaced by an almost con-
tinuous series of forecasts that match the actual direction of one-quarter
change. Whereas the raw forecast gave the wrong direction 28 times out of
47 quarters in 1928-39, the reconstituted forecast gives the wrong direction
only 14 times. Furthermore, the 14 disagreements include 4 (at IV 1929,
111933, IV 1937, and III 1938—our D and U quarters) which are required
by hypothesis, and 3 more (at IV 1932, III 1937, and IV 1938) which have
a similar relation to the major turning points. Out of the 35 quarters
(including IV 1932) not tagged with D, U, or T and excluded from some
analyses on grounds that, near turns, plans could very likely not be
executed, the H-prediction on a seasonally adjusted basis disagrees with
30Iexperimented to see whether aYg=At/Acouldbe more closely estimated by an
equation that lets the understatement coefficient be a function of the date and of the
size of the four-quarter change to be estimated. Results were negative. Consequently,
the simple equation used may be taken as my best estimate of the way to adjust the raw
forecast with allowance for smooth changes over time and over differences in size of
forecast. But any attempt to allow for less continuous changes in the degree of under-
statement of change would have to rest on correlation of the shippers' series with outside
data (for example, with orders), which I have not attempted.
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theactual direction of one-quarter change 7 times, compared with 25
times for the raw forecast.
A closer look reveals that almost all the disagreements in direction of
one-quarter change are of a single type. In only 2 (in 11932 and III 1936)
does the H-prediction forecast a turn which fails to happen. In the other
12 the H-prediction forecasts a continuation of the previous direction of
change while the actual data exhibit a reversal of direction. Of the 15
actual changes of direction in the seasonally adjusted figures, only 4 (at
III 1928, 11933, 11935, and III 1935) were picked up by the H-prediction.
Thus if this reconstitution is correct, it says that almost without exception
the shippers expected continuation of the recent direction of movement
and were surprised by turning points.31
Our chief interest must be in the one-quarter-change forecasts with
seasonal adjustment, because this adjustment gives more scope for
inquiries into extrapolative patterns of forecasting. But since the seasonal
adjustment unavoidably brings in an arbitrary element, it is worth pausing
to look at the relation of one-quarter changes without seasonal adjust-
ment.
Without Seasonal Adjustment. On an unadjusted basis for 46 quarters32
the series of actual changes (denoted by= shows 22 changes
of direction between 111928 and IV 1939, of which no less than 15 are
picked up by the H-prediction hXf = Xbeing the one-quarter
equivalent of Y. Besides missing 7 turns, the H-prediction calls for turns
which did not happen in 7 of the 24 quarters when the direction of quarter-
to-quarter change continued.
For the 34 quarters when it seems reasonably likely that expectations
could be fulfilled, the correlation of one-quarter actual and H-predicted
changes is fairly high (r2=O.72). This is much better than we can do on
the naïve-model hypothesis thatcan be explained by the year-previous
change aXi—4 =A,_4/A,_5;for this yields an r2 of only 0.45. An alternative
naïve-model hypothesis would be that the actual change ax: can be ex-
plained by the seasonally-to-be-expected change )4= this yields
an r2 of 0.56. Thus the gross predictive value of the H-prediction for one-
quarter change is appreciably better than that of either naïve hypothesis.
Furthermore, combining the seasonally-to-be-expected and H-predicted
31Inthe original version of this paper, 1 was inclined to view the shippers as missing
major turns but picking up minor ones. This impression seems to go back to the rough-
ness of my original seasonal adjustment. In view of Ruth Mack's finding that the
mechanism of "sub-cycles" seems to be a reversal of the inventory band wagon (an
event one would naturally interpret as surprising), it is much more reasonable that
expectations should miss minor as well as major turns. (See Mrs. Mack's paper in
American Economic Review, Supplement, May 1957, pp. 161-174).
32Welose one quarter as against the previous basis of calculations because we need to
compare actual changes with previous-year changes at the same season (that is, with
a reliable A, for quarter 11927 means that our first
estimate of 4X,_4 applies to quarter III 1928.
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change in a joint regression for the actual change gives an R2 of 0.76. The
gain over the simple correlation for the seasonally-to-be-expected change
is large enough to give a partial r2 of about 0.44 for the H-predicted
change.
The H-predicted change shows a strong relation to the seasonally-to-
be-expected change—as of course it must in order to be a good predictor
of actual change without seasonal adjustment in our thirty-four quarters.
The correlation of hXt withyields an r2 of 0.55. In addition, the H-
predicted change shows a significant element of extrapolation from a year
previous. If we take a joint regression for hXlon and aXg—4 it yields an
R2 of 0.64, indicating a partial r2 for aXr_4 of about 0.21. That is, there are
some signs that nonseasonal change a year previous helps shape the fore-
cast, in addition to seasonal allowances. Since has no net predictive
value forwhen seasonality is taken into account,33 this element in the
forecast can oily be a source of error. If therefore the H-predicted change
hX: is more highly correlated with actual change aA't than is the seasonally-
to-be-expected change it can only be because hX€ includes valid evi-
dence on nonseasonal changes in prospect.
This view is confirmed by the fact that the predictive value of the
H-prediction falls (while that of the seasonally-to-be-expected change does
not) as we bring into our calculations the quarters when expectations were
less likely to be fulfilled. If we recalculate for forty-two quarters (still
excluding the four quarters of most drastic change, denoted by D and U),
the r2 for aXt on hXt drops to 0.60, while the r2 for aA'g onstands almost
unaffected at 0.54. If we go all the way to forty-six quarters, the r2 for
hX:dropsto 0.34—now markedly below that for which is still sub-
stantially the same (r2=0.56).
Finally does the H-predicted change continue to conform to the actual
at the appropriate points (i.e. for quarters on our list of thirty-four) if
we make separate comparisons for each time of year? This test denies the
H-prediction the benefit of knowing what time of year it is, as the correla-
tion rests on divergence from the seasonal pattern in the actual and
estimated changes. Since our thirty-four quarters are now split into four
groups, individual statistical results from the four calculations rest on too
few observations to carry any statistical weight. But the uniformity of
33 The correlation of aXi =A1/A1_1with sXt =St/Si-iand the previous-year change
aXg-4 =Ag_4/Ai_5yields an R2 of only 0.587, compared with an r2foralone of 0.562
over the thirty-four quarters.
This result should not surprise us. If the seasonal adjustment is unbiased, the residue
of previous-year change after allowing for seasonality would exhibit a correlation with
the current change only if the series exhibited either long runs of seasonally adjusted
change in one direction or cycles close to a year in length (five or three quarters). The
present series has neither characteristic; so our expectation is that the systematic
element in the relation of aXt to aXl-4 will all be incorporated in the seasonal adjust.
ment.
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results from the four tests is entitled to be taken seriously. For each of the
four times of year:34
1. Actual change has a positive correlation with H-predicted change.
2. Correlation of actual change with previous-year change, though
positive, is much smaller.
3. In a joint regression of actual on previous-year and H-predicted
change, the latter accounts for the bulk of the variance "explained."
With Seasonal Adjustment. Analysis of seasonally adjusted data has the
advantage that it makes the changes in recent quarters most comparable
with current change. Thus it lends itself to a search for extrapolative
influences on forecasts.









For the thirty-four quarters when intentions are most likely to have been
carried out, an extrapolative estimate of the actual changefrom all four
pieces of recent experience yields an R2 of This is weaker than the
34 The seasonally-to-be-expected change does not figure in the calculations because in
comparisons for a single time of year it varies only with its trend. For the two remaining
predictive variables, and excluding the eight T quarters and four D and U quarters, the
relevant correlations are as follows:
QUARTERS RELATED
I II III IV
with with with with
IV I II III
aXt on ,1X1:r2 0.34 0.21 0.53 0.78
aXgOnaX::r2 .03 .02 .11 .40
aXion and .34 .25 .54 .84
on aXt—4:r2 .06 .34 .34 .74
Compare the first three lines with the negative correlations obtained for raw forecasts
at three of the four times of year by Ferber (p. 77). And in the last line, the four time-of-
year calculations agree also in finding a positive correlation betweenand the previous-
year change aXt-4,confirmingthe impression that the previous year's events enter
(irrationally) into forecasts. Except for changes from the third to the fourth quarter,
where aX:—4 happens to have a fairly strong correlation with aXg, this influence on the
predictionmust be a source of error (or at best of random differences).
35 This could just as well be described as an estimate based on the last three pieces of
experience, excluding aXl—4, for the multiple correlation is just the same whether we do
or do not introduce this variable. This absence of predictive value for the previous-
year change, as we saw in footnote 34, indicates the success of our seasonal adjustment.
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r2 of 0.44 which we find when we correlate with Furthermore,
a compound prediction using the H-predicted change together with all
the extrapolative elements yields a considerably improved correlation:
R2=0.56. The margin by which this exceeds the R2 obtained on a purely
extrapolative basis leaves a partial r2 forof 0.33. Thus it is plain that
has net as well as gross predictive value.36
The relation of the prediction to previous experience seems to show a
fairly reasonable pattern. A multiple regression
ofrecent experience yields an R2 of 0.39. The greater part of the predictive
value of recent experience for the reconstituted forecast seems to spring
from the most recent history: for on alone, the
r2=O.32.37
When we take in quarters when expectations were less likely to be ful-
filled, the admixture of surprises pulls the forecasting correlation down
rapidly. For forty-two quarters, though an extrapolative estimate still
produces an R2 of 0.37, the simple correlation of actual on H-predicted
change is reduced to an r2 of 0.35, and the partial r2 falls to 0.22. On a
forty-six-quarterbasis,theextrapolativeestimateis much weaker
(R2 =0.18),and the simple correlation (r2 =0.09)and partial r2 (0.01) for
become negligible. On the other hand, the apparent relation of H-
prediction to antecedent experience remains much the same.38
FORECASTS AND SURPRISES
How seriously can we take the H-predicted change as a measure of the
specific changes at specific times? The fact that for our thirty-four quarters
the r2 for onis rather modest (0.44) might suggest either that the
original plans were loose or that much random noise remained in the
signal even after our rectification. But the correlation itself is inconclusive;
once more we must ask whether the deviations as well as the similarities
have a story to tell.
Actual one-quarter changes, seasonally adjusted, are graphed as a time
series in the upper curve of Chart 5. The curve below shows the H-pre-
As usual, we could make a better showing for the H-prediction if our central
concern were forecasting with data available as soon as the shippers' forecast becomes
available, ruling out At-i and hence A forecast of 5X1 from the other more
remote elements of experience yields an R2 of only 0.09 compared with the r2of0.44
fromalone. Thus the forecast would at the very least be useful as a way of mobilizing
evidence on before it would ordinarily be available.
This comparison, however, is biased slightly in favor of the H-prediction by its use of
two elements of hindsight: both the seasonal adjustment and the change—understatement
coefficient are estimated from data for the entire period 1928-39.
37 By some fluke, the calculations show no net predictive value for the second-most-
recent item of experience,
38 For the prediction on the most-recent-experience item r2 over forty-six
quarters is 0.26—slightly less than for thirty-four quarters. But R2 using all four items
of experience goes up to 0.41. The year-previous change showsa positive regression
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CHART 5
Carloadings of All Manufactured Products,
dicted changes. For our best thirty-four quarters (dark-shaded areas) the
general family resemblance on which the correlation rests is clearly visible;
so is the appropriate disagreement around the main turns (light-shaded
areas). But for present purposes, the main interest attaches to the bottom
curve, which traces the ratio of actual to expected one-quarter changes
= This may be read as an index of surprise—upward-pointing
teeth on the curve showingquarter-to-quarter changes more favorable
than our index says was expected (agreeable surprises), and downward-
pointing teeth less favorable (disagreeable surprises). The surprises regis-
tered at the four main turns are appropriate on the hypothesis that we
have a valid index of expected changes.39 But whether the wobble during
39Howeverthe allegedly expected adverse changes in 1938 (and the apparent dis-
agreeable surprise) are unplausibly large. As with forecast four-quarter changes, the
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CHART6








the thirty-four best quarters (dark-shaded parts of the chart) is appropriate,
we cannot say without further examination.
By the same logic which makes it appropriate for the H-prediction to
miss major turns of activity, the index of surprise should be related to the
acceleration of seasonally adjusted actual carloadings (that is, to an index
This is indeed the case, as may be seen from Chart 6.
Here the top curve (carried forward from Chart 5) is our index of surprise
the lower curve the index of acceleration. The relation of
surprise to acceleration at the major turns is shown by the parallel saw-
teeth in the dotted parts of the curves. Besides, there is a marked family
resemblance between the parts of the two curves (dark-shaded areas)
which report on our best thirty-four quarters. Of the 6 sharp points of
disagreeable surprise (at 11932, 1V 1933, III 1934, 111935, 11936, and
11939), only I (at 11932) lacks a counterpart on the acceleration curve.
The 5 peaks of agreeable surprise (at 111929, III 1932, 11934, and III
1939) do not fare so well: only 2 (at 11934 and III 1939) have definite
counterparts, while the highest rate of acceleration on the chart (at 11935)
fails to induce agreeable surprise. Thus the relation between surprises and
acceleration is one of the weaker ones in the complex we are investigating,
upturn of 1938 was unusually well advertised and was in fact the only one of the four
major turns not missed by the four-quarter-change estimates. Perhaps here the correction
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yet apparently significant: over thirty-four quarters r2= 0.25, over forty-
six quarters r2 =0.29.Broadly speaking, we may say that of the variance
in the one-quarter forecastwithin the best thirty-four quarters, 44 per
cent is accounted for by valid forecasting of actual change and about a
quarter of the remainder by identifiable failures to register forces acceler-
ating or decelerating the actual carloadings. Thus on the hypothesis that
the original signals registered coherent actual expectations, some 42 per
cent of the variance in our reconstituted one-quarter forecasts must be
attributed to noise picked up in the process of coding and decoding the
message.
Such a result is scarcely surprising given the degree of arbitrariness in
the way the figures were processed. It implies a standard error for H-
predicted one-quarter changes of about 5.4 per cent. A zone of this width
around unity is marked off on Chart 5. Taking one standard error as the
margin beyond which an H-prediction probably registers an actual
expectation that carloadings will move in the indicated direction, we may





1929 1a, 111b,Iva II
1930 iv i, ii, iii
1931 1,11 Iii, IV
1932 1a, iVa III
1933 111b iva j,ija
1934 II 1a, 111a,
1935 i,iv ua,lli
1936 i 1b, 111a, iv
1937 II i, ma, Wa
1938 IVa
1939 i, it, iv 111b
aQuarterswhere actual change was in the opposite direction from H-predicted change.
b Quarters where a small change was indicated but a large change in the predicted
direction eventuated.
For specific figures, see Table A-2.
It is plain that a large proportion of the most interesting quarters must
be classified as doubtful. On the other hand, some generalizations at least
of a negative character can be offered. From the beginning of 1929 till
mid-1933, there was not a single quarter (unless we count I 1932, with
an H-predicted increase of 4.3 per cent) when expansion was probably
expected. Similarly, from mid-1933 until early 1938, there was not a
single quarter (unless we count III 1936, with an H-predicted drop of 3.7
per cent) when contraction was probably expected. On the whole,
then, expectations appear to have reinforced rather than braked the
major swings of business. Hesitation in 1929 and 1937 may have
229A REVALUATION OF THE SHIPPERS' FORECAST
facilitated the downturns, but the two upturns seem to have happened
despite strong expectations to the contrary.
Further Uses of the Shippers' Forecasts
From this examination, it appears likely that by simple adjustments to
filter out bias we can transform the shippers' forecast into a workable
source of data on what businessmen expected about the physical volume
operations, and thus can go a long way toward rescuing expectational
interpretations of the past from the limbo of the unobservable. As mea-
sures of both four-quarter changes and future level, the reconstituted
forecast behaves just as it should if it represents actual expectations. As a
measure of one-quarter change, it shows some weaknesses, inevitably
impaired by the noise which the adjustment procedure fails to remove.
But then much of the time the most skilled business cycle analysts are in
some doubt about which way the economy is currently moving.
Even as they stand, the data afford a testing ground for some hypotheses
about fluctuations. In particular, they can test the hypothesis that changes
of expectations trigger major turning points in business—it flunks the test
disastrously. Much more can be done by dealing with component series.
Reweighting the components by value added instead of shipping-space
requirements is likely to yield a more revealing aggregate. Furthermore,
collation of these data with evidence on orders may cast a good deal of
light on the relationship of orders to business operating decisions.
The analysis of component series will also provide strong tests for
hypotheses on the formation of expectations. For example, we can test
how much expectations in a given industry are shaped by the general state
of business, how much by the industry's own experience. And comparison
of postwar and interwar data can give clues to the stability of estimation
patterns.
Finally, a good deal of data from which expectations can be recon-
structed seems to exist, but it is probably fragmentary. However, the
shippers' forecast may provide a framework by which the other series
can be calibrated. And the apparent coherence of the shippers' forecast
should encourage us to search for other data and to develop theories that
can illuminate the data and be tested by them.
APPENDIX
SYMBOLS USED AND THEIR DERiVATIONS
Symbols Used in Equations
Aindicates actual carloadings
aindicates deviations from mean of actual carloadings
aas a subscript indicates the symbol refers to actual carloadings
Eindicates expected carloadings (shippers' forecast)
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eas a subscript indicates the symbol refers to expected carloadings
Findicates the Federal Reserve Board index of manufacturing pro-
duction
H indicates reconstituted prediction (corrected for bias)
hindicates a deviation from mean of the reconstituted prediction
has a subscript indicates a symbol refers to the reconstituted pre-
diction
Sindicates the seasonal adjustment coefficient
sas a superscript indicates that a symbol has been seasonally adjusted
sas a subscript indicates that a symbol refers to the seasonal adjust-
ment
1, t— 1, 1—4, etc., as subscripts indicate the quarter to which the figure
refers (current quarter, previous quarter, four quarters or a year
previous, etc.)
X indicates one-quarter change
Yindicates four-quarter change
yindicates deviation from mean of four-quarter change
Zindicates acceleration of change
Their Derivations and Examples
A: and E1 are the basic data, transcribed from Ferber
sA, indicates actual carloadings in the current quarter, seasonally
adjusted





=h =impliedexpectation of level of actual carloadings for
a given quarter
= =thesame, seasonally adjusted




I.C — a1/h C
Indicatorsin Charts and Tables
oindicatesforecast in the wrong direction
tindicatesa forecast in the right direction but an overestimate
A indicates the forecast and outcome coincide
Dindicates a quarter in which a major downswing took on momentum
Uindicates a quarter in which a major upswing took on momentum
Tindicates a quarter (other than a D or U quarter) containing or just
following a major turning point
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TABLE A-I
Actual and Estimated Carloadings, All Manufactured Products, Seasonal Adjustment
Coefficient, and Index of Manufacturing Production, 1927-1939
(carloadingsin millions of cars)
NO SEASONAL ADJUSTMENTWITH SEASONAL ADJUSTMENT MANy-
Recon- Recon- FACTURINO
YEAR Actual stitu fed Actual stitutedSEASONALPRODUCTION,


















ii 3.47 — 3.09 — — 1.12 51
in 3.41 3.77 3.21 3.55 — 1.06 50
iv 3.01 3.15 3.33 3.49 — 0.90 48
1928:
3.06 3.27 — 3.24 3.57 — 0.92 50
ii 3.42 3.61 3.58 3.07 3.24 3.19 1.12 51
iii 3.42 3.60 3.64 3.24 3.41 3.42 1.06 53
iv 3.18 3.18 3.20 3.48 3.48 3.55 0.91 56
1929:
i 3.18 3.24 3.28 3.46 3.52 3.58 0.92 57
ii 3.79 3.61 3.04 3.43 3.26 3.27 1.11 59
TIII 3.62 3.57 3.55 3.44 3.40 3.36 1.05 60
Div 3.01 3.30 3.25 3.26 3.58 3.56 0.92 55
1930:
T i 2.96 3.10 2.80 3.21 3.36 3.05 0.92 52
ii 3.21 3.66 3.26 2.92 3.33 2.95 1.10 50
iii 2.77 3.34 2.76 2.65 2.99 2.62 1.05 45
iv 2.29 2.79 2.32 2.46 2.99 2.52 0.93 42
193 1:
i 2.21 2.71 2.22 2.34 2.93 2.39 0.92 42
ii 2.45 3.00 2.32 2.25 2.75 2.31 1.09 42
in 2.10 2.55 2.10 2.02 2.45 2.01 1.04 38
iv 1.67 2.11 1.74 1.77 2.24 1.87 0.94 34
1932:
i 1.44 2.05 1.71 1.55 2.21 1.81 0.93 33
ii 1.55 2.13 1.58 1.43 1.97 1.44 1.08 29
1.38 1.77 1.23 1.33 1.71 1.17 1.04 28
iv 1.34 1.52 1.23 1.41 1.60 1.29 0.95 30
1933:
T i 1.21 1.37 1.19 1.30 1.47 1.28 0.93 29
Un 1.62 1.43 1.18 1.51 1.33 1.09 1.07 35
Tiii 1.79 1.54 1.71 1.74 1.50 1.60 1.02 43
Iv 1.54 1.54 1.71 1.60 1.60 1.80 0.97 36
1934:
I 1.63 1.34 1.43 1.75 1.44 1.54 0.93 39
ii 1.90 1.86 2.06 1.78 1.74 1.92 1.07 42
in 1.71 1.88 1.88 1.67 1.83 1.83 1.02 37
iv 1.55 1.60 1.58 1.60 1.65 1.64 0.97 38
1935:
1.73 1.72 1.73 1.85 1.84 1.86 0.94 44
ii 1.89 2.01 2.03 1.79 1.90 1.90 1.06 44
in 1.89 1.85 1.92 1.85 1.81 1.88 1.02 46
iv 1.95 1.75 1.90 1.99 1.77 1.97 0.98 50
[table continues on next page
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TABLE A-I, continued
NO SEASONAL ADJUSTMENTWITH SEASONAL ADJUSTMENT MANU-
Recon- Recon- FAGTURING
YEAR Actual stitutedActual stitutedSEASONALPRODUCTION,


















i 1.93 1.92 2.05 2.06 2.05 2.20 0.94 49
ii 2.33 2.10 2.25 2.22 2.00 2.13 1.05 53
in 2.36 2.07 2.18 2.33 2.04 2.13 1.02 57
iv 2.40 2.18 2.35 2.43 2.20 2.38 0.99 60
1937:
2.37 2.19 2.40 2.52 2.33 2.56 0.94 63
T ii 2.66 2.60 2.70 2.55 2.50 2.67 1.04 64
Tiii 2.55 2.58 2.71 2.53 2.56 2.68 1.01 63
Dtv 2.07 2.54 2.56 2.07 2.54 2.60 1.00 50
1938:
i 1.75 2.08 1.57 1.85 2.20 1.66 0.94 43
T ii 1.86 2.17 1.39 1.80 2.10 1.32 1.03 42
Uiii 1.91 2.02 1.19 1.90 2.01 1.18 1.00 47
TIV 2.02 2.02 1.83 2.00 2.00 1.81 1.01 52
1939:
i 1.96 1.97 2.14 2.07 2.08 2.26 0.95 53
ii 2.16 2.11 2.31 2.11 2.06 2.23 1.03 53
in 2.22 2.07 2.15 2.22 2.07 2.15 1.00 57
iv 2.47 2.26 2.44 2.43 2.22 2.41 1.02 45
Formeaning of the symbols used, see the list in this appendix.
Source: Cols. Ag and E,—Robert Ferber, The Railroad Shippers' Forecasts, University of
Illinois Press, 1953, p. 138. Col. Hg—From correlations described in the text. Col. Sg—
Fitted by the author to actual carloadings for 1947-51 by ratios to moving average. Col. F,—
Federal Reserve index, 1947-49 =100,FederalReserveBulletin, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
TABLE A-2
Link Relatives of Actual and Predicted Carloadings,
All Manufactured Products, 1927-1939






Adjustment No Seasonal Adjustment
YEAR Actual Recon-Seasonal ActualRecon-Actual.Recon-
AND Car-Shippers'stituted Coef- Car-stitutedCar-stituted
QUARTERloadings Forecast Prediction
(a Y) Y) (hY)
ficientloadings Prediction
(s A') (aX) (h X)
loadings Prediction
1927:
ni — — 0.9450.983 — 1.040 —
iv — — — 0.8510.883 — 1.037 —
1928:
I — — — 1.0151.017 — 1.002 —
Ii 0.9861.04001.0280 1.2171.118 — 0.919 —
Ut 1.0031.056t 1.064 0.9481.000 1.061 1.055 1.113
IV 1.0561.056A1.064 0.8640.9300.939 1.0761.096
1929:
1 1.0391.059t1.071 1.007 1.0001.031 0.9931.0270
ii 1.108 1.056 1.064 1.204 1.1921.145 0.9900.945
Tnt 1.058 1.044 1.037 0.9500.955 0.937 1.0060.981 0
Div 0.9471.038 01.023 0 0.8770.8320.901 0.9471.0350
[table continues on next page
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TABLE A-2, continued






YEAR Actual Recon-Seasonal ActualRecon-ActualRecon-
AND Car-Shippers'stituted Coef- Car-stitutedCar-stituted
QUARTERloadings Forecast Prediction





T i 0.9310.975 0.881 1.0000.9830.930 0.9840.933
ii 0.8470.966 0.860 1.1921.0841.101 0.9100.919
in 0.7650.923 0.763 0.9520.8630.860 0.9060.899
iv 0.7610.927 0.772 0.8910.8270.838 0.9260.951
1931:
0.7470.916 0.750 0.9930.9650.965 0.9720.973
ii 0.7630.935 0.722 1.179 1.1091.050 0.9410.891
in 0.7580.921 0.759 0.9550.8570.857 0.8980.895
iv 0.7290.921 0.759 0.9050.7950.829 0.8790.924
1932:
i 0.6520.928 0.774 0.9860.8620.124 00.8751.043 0
ii 0.6330.869 0.643 1.167 1.076 1.090 0.9230.924
in 0.6570.843 0.584 0.9570.8900.787 0.9310.816
Iv 0.8020.910 0.736 0.9180.9710.884 1.0570.973 0
1933:
T i 0.8400.951 0.826 0.9790.9030.888 0.9230.911
Uiz 1.0450.92300.763 0 1.155 1.3390.97501.1600.841 0
Tin 1.2971.116 1.199 0.959 1.1051.025 1.152 1.062
iv 1.1491.149A1.276 0.9320.8600.955 0.9231.035 0
1934:
i 1.347 1.107 1.179 0.972 1.0580.92901.0890.5490
it 1.1731.148 1.274 1.143 1.1661.266 1.021 1.099
iii 0.9551.05801.0500 0.9620.9000.990 0.9361.0250
iv 1.006i.039t1.025 0.9460.9060.924 0.9580.986
1935:
i 1.061 1.055 1.062 0.965 1.116 1.116 1.156 1.161
it 0.9951.058 01.068 0 1.131 1.093 1.173 0.9661.0320
in 1.105 1.082 1.123 0.964 1.0001.016 1.038 1.050
iv 1.258 1.129 1.229 0.9601.0321.011 1.0741.062
1936:
1.1161.110 1.186 0.9590.9901.05101.033 1.102
ii 1.233 1.111 1.188 1.119 1.207 1.166 1.079 1.034
in 1.249 1.095 1.152 0.976 1.0130.93601.0480.963 0
iv 1.231 1.118 1.204 0.974 1.1070.96601.044 1.033
1937:
i 1.228 1.135 1.242 0.9520.988 1.000 1.037 1.052
Tn 1.142 1.116 1.199 1.107 1.122 1.181 1.014 1.059
Tin 1.081 1.141 0.9690.9591.01900.9891.0460
Div 0.8631.04801.0680 0.9890.8121.00800.8211.0280
1938:
0.7380.878 0.664 0.9460.8450.759 0.8940.800
T ii 0.6990.816 0.523 1.095 1.0630.789 00.9710.713
Uni 0.7490.792 0.467 0.972 1.0270.640 01.0570.6540
fly 0.976 0.883 1.003 1.0580.95801.0540.964 0
1939:
i 1.1201.126t1.222 0.9400.9701.059 01.032 1.132
ii 1.1611.134 1.240 1.0841.1021.179 1.0171.080
in 1.162 1.084 1.125 0.974 1.1130.99501.055 1.019
iv 1.223 1.119 1.208 1.018 1.113 1.099 1.093 1.090
For the meaning of the symbols used, see the list in this Appendix.
Source: calculated from Table A-i.
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COMMENT
DAVID C. MELNICOFF, The Pennsylvania Railroad
The focus of Albert Hart's paper is not on forecasting as such, but
rather on the role of forecasts as indicators of businessmen's expectations.
If expectations can be measured and related to business fluctuations, we
might, indeed, have a "powerful testing device" for cyclical analysis and
theory—provided, of course, that expectations and their fulfillment or
denial engender a consistent pattern of stimulus and response over time.
The shippers' advisory board forecasts seem a likely source of data, but
it is not yet clear just how useful these data can be.
Hart was dissatisfied with earlier analyses of the shippers' forecasts not
only because the results just did not feel right in view of his theoretical
predilections, but also because of some other experience with the behavior
of anticipations data and the testing of survey results. His new analysis
and his statistical results—though even rougher than he concedes—are
impressive. His hypothesis, which follows suggestions of Ferber, Hastay,
and others, has much to recommend it. At least, it jibes with some of my
own experience. The correction for what appears to be a systematic bias
yields the kind of results that make sense: that is, they do not violate
most conceptions of what expectations ought to be. It is impressive—but
not completely convincing.
An old story, told with many variations, is apropos. Once a lion tamer
who had just received a large and ferocious beast from the African jungles
was preparing to enter the lion's cage, in purple tights and armed only
with a short stick. A friend tried to stop him, but the trainer insisted he
would have no trouble. "You see," he said, "my theory is that purple
tights set up an emotional disturbance for the lion which renders him
incapable of any violence so long as I hold the stick. I have great confi-
dence in this theory, and I know it will work out." "Yes," said the friend,
"you know the theory—but does the lion?"
Now, in contrast with the lion tamer's foolish theory, Hart sets forth an
eminently reasonable hypothesis. I am sure, however, that the traffic
managers who report to the advisory boards do not know that this is the
way they are supposed to operate! And I question whether the assumed
conditions remained stable during the entire period under review. We
cannot know to what extent they prevailed without reviewing the pro-
cedures and forecasts of individual firms and of the chairmen of commodity
groups. Given the age distribution of traffic managers, few of the indi-
viduals involved in the interwar forecasts are still available for interview.
But one might interview those who are currently making the forecasts and
compare current performance with that of the interwar years. This might
provide not only some insight into the problem by analogy but also direct
evidence on whether the forecasting procedures used today are the same as
those of thirty years ago.
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The tests suggested by Hart are helpful but not conclusive. In particular,
the second, which relates shippers' forecasts to changes in the earlier part
of the year, is subject to varying interpretation, and even the calculated
regression coefficients do not seem to tell a consistent story.
Of course, the statistical correction for understatement of year-to-year
change does not depend on or grow out of the assumptions of the hypo-
thesis. Though it is probably essential to the analysis that the forecasts
were made in relation to the level of carloadings of the previous year
rather than to that of the previous quarter, the hypothesis is only one
possible explanation of why the data behave as they do. One can readily
agree on the probability of the year-to-year forecast yet not believe that
there are only two large groups of forecasters with only two forecasting
patterns. The forecasts are made by many highly diversified groups and
thus exhibit a large variety of errors and many different types of bias.
What the data show isthat forecasters—in the aggregate—make
year-to-year predictions in the right direction, but usually go only about
half as high or low as they should. On correcting for bias the results come
close enough to the "actual" outcome to appear reasonable. But even
aside from the omission of turning-point situations, the statistical results
allow one to say only, "These are the expectations of one large group—
the only group we need consider because the other group is not registering
its expectations at all." In fact, uninformed guesses of yeal-to-year changes
with no relationship to the decision-making process of the firm can come
so close to the actual results that Hart's statistical methodology cannot
differentiate them. The shippers' expectations could be completely without
rhyme or reason, rather than neatly divided, and the statistics alone would
not disclose this.
The corrected forecasts lag, they do not lead; there is little in these
data which guarantees to the railroads, a better tool for forecasting car
requirements. Nevertheless, they may show sufficient promise to warrant
looking for predictors among some of the individual series. More rigorous
and detailed tests should be undertaken. In the meantime, one must be
wary of taking the adjusted forecasts as firm expectations of a significant
group of business firms and using them as though they were a reliable
tool in business cycle analysis. We do not yet have such a tool, but Hart's
paper suggests that we may someday be able to fashion one.
DONALD J. DALY, Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce
Albert Hart gives no serious attention to Hultgren's study, an unfor-
tunate omission because Hultgren's excellent brief article made an impor-
tant contribution to the subject. 1•Hisessential point was that the shippers'
1ThorHultgren, "Forecasts of Railway Traffic," Short-Term Economic Forecasting,
Studies in income and Wealth, Vol. 17, Princeton University Press for the National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1955.
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unsatisfactory view of nonseasonal changes over the recent three-quarters
of a year had adverse effects on their comparisons of freight car require-
ments one quarter ahead with those of the same quarter in the previous
year.
Professional economists and statisticians generally accept the advan-
tages of using seasonally adjusted data when analyzing recent changes in
the economy. Such data show up underlying changes more clearly than
unadjusted data do and are essential if changes in a six-month period, in
particular, are to be evaluated at its close.2 Yet in my experience business
firms rely heavily on comparisons of current operating statistics with those
of the same month a year previous and tend to draw conclusions on
recent changes in them. For the individual firm and industry, however,
such comparisons can frequently lead to incorrect conclusions and con-
tribute to incorrect anticipations. Thus to the shippers who make rather
accurate forecasts and to the many who estimate "same as last year"
should probably be added a group of companies whose forecasts are poor
because their conclusions are based on an incorrect assessment of recent
developments, and there is some evidence that the last group is significant.
Seasonal variations, which are relatively more important for individual
firms and industries than for industry as a whole, can affect the views of
businessmen on the recent past and, therefore, their short-run outlook.
Hart raised this point, but it is also relevant to the volume as a whole. It
contains no serious discussion of seasonal factors in business operating
statistics, of whether the treatment of seasonal factors by businessmen has
been adequate, and of whether, if inadequate, the inadequacy had any
effect on businessmen's expectations. However previous studies have
recognized the problem, and Ferber has indicated that further empirical
data are being gathered that may throw light on it.
ROBERT EISNER, Northwestern University
Whatever the implications of Ferber's data or Hart's revaluation of
them, it is interesting to note the grounds on which truly "regressive"
expectations may be rationalized. These relate to possibilities of inter-
temporal substitution and suggest that there should be at least a com-
ponent of expectations which is regressive.
Data collected from one large shoe manufacturer in the course of a
study of expectations and investment revealed a sharp negative correlation
preseason or early season orders and those of the balance of the
season. A ready explanation lies in the stability of shoe demand—more
early buying means less later buying. Thus where sales were higher during
2Foran excellent article covering this point and giving some results from the use of
electronic computers to compute seasonal adji.fstments, see Julius Shiskin, "Electronic
Computers and Business Indicators," Journal of Business, October 1957, reprinted as
Occasional Paper 57 by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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the first two months of aseasonthan in the corresponding two months
the year before, they would tend to be lower in the ensuing months than
in the same period the year before. If actual sales changes proceed in this
regressive fashion, a similar regressive character in expectations would
hardly be surprising.
An opportunity to observe this relationship again was found in the
McGraw—Hill data at my disposal. In late 1949, McGraw—Hill respon-
dents were asked for the percentage figure by which they expected 1950
sales to depart from 1949 sales. When the expectations were related to
actual 1948-49 percentage sales changes, the simple linear correlation was
found to be virtually zero. However, some nonlinear correlation was
apparent. Higher sales were expected in greater proportion both by firms
whose sales had increased the most (10 per cent or more) and by those
whose sales had decreased the most (more than 20 per cent). Among
firms expecting some change in sales, increases were expected by 75 per
cent of the above "extremes" as against only 47 per cent of those with
moderate sales-change experience. (Tschuprow's T was 0.25, significant at
the 1 per cent level, and the tetrachoric coefficient of correlation was 0.42.)
If one assumes that a high proportion of firms with large 1948-49 sales
changes were also long-run growth firms, data on past capacity changes
can be used to enlighten this relationship. And the relation between sales-
change expectations and prior changes in capacity was found to be
strongly positive. For the 1939-48 changes in capacity (T=0.36) and
1947-48 changes (T=O.25) the correlations were significant at the 1 per
cent level.
More and better data will certainly be needed to formulate more than a
tentative hypothesis. But the findings touched upon here are at least not
obviously inconsistent with a theory I have proposed elsewhere that short-
term sales expectations are compounded of two elements, the long-term
trend (with which short-term sales expectations are positively correlated)
and short-term deviatIons from the long-term trend (with negative corre-
lation). Whatever the direction of the long-term trend, a short-term sales
change that deviates markedly from the long-term expectations may be
seen as essentially stochastic and thus lead to expectations of a reversal
back toward the trend in the following year.'
1RobertEisner, "Expectations, Plans and Capital Expenditures: A Synthesis of Ex
Post and Ex Ante Data," Expectations, Uncertainty and Business Behavior, Mary Jean
Bowman, ed., Social Science Research Council, 1958, esp. p. 162.
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